State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from February 24, 1993 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
2-24-1993 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from February 24, 1993 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from February 
24, 1993 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/394 
2A- 2/24/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS, 
DISTRICT UNION LOCAL 1, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
=ana= CASE NOT^>-3695 
MOHAWK VALLEY NURSING HOME, 
Employer . 
BELSON & SZUFLITA (GENE M. SZUFLITA of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
TOBIN & DEMPF (JOHN W. CLARK of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated August 14, 1991,-1 we determined that the 
United Food and Commercial Workers, District Union Local 1, AFL-
CIO (Petitioner) had been selected by a majority of employees of 
the Mohawk Valley Nursing Home (Employer) to be the exclusive 
representative of the following unit: 
Included: All full-time and regular part-time (more 
than 20 hours per week) Licensed Practical 
Nurses, Nurses Aides, Activities Assistants 
and Ward Clerks. 
Excluded: All Registered Nurses, per diem casual or 
seasonal employees, confidential employees, 
guards, supervisors, medical record clerks, 
cooks, diet technicians, dietary aides, 
maintenance workers, housekeepers, laundry 
workers, feeder/transporters and all other 
nursing home employees. 
I 
1724 PERB f3018 (1991) . 
Board - C-3695 2 
Accordingly, we certified the Petitioner and ordered the 
Employer to negotiate with it. Our decision and order was based 
upon an election in which forty-two votes were cast in favor of 
representation by the Petitioner and forty-one votes were cast 
against representation. That tally of ballots reflected a vote 
cast by an employee, which we had voided by decision dated July 
10, 1991.2/ 
The Employer appealed from our certification of the 
Petitioner on the ground that we had incorrectly voided the 
employee's ballot. By decision dated December 24, 1992, the 
Appellate Division, Third Department, held the employee eligible 
to vote.-7 Pursuant to the Court's decision, the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation opened the 
employee's ballot. The ballot was cast against representation. 
The final tally of ballots reflects forty-two votes cast in 
favor of representation by the Petitioner and forty-two votes 
cast against representation, with no outstanding challenged 
ballots. Petitioner, therefore, has not demonstrated majority 
support within the unit previously described. 
^
724 PERB f3010 (1991). The employee's ballot was voided because 
she was not employed on the date the ballots in the mail ballot 
election were counted. 
-
7Mohawk Valley Nursing Home, Inc. v. PERB, A.D.2d , 
25 PERB f7017 (3d Dep't 1992). The Court held the employee 
eligible to vote because she had mailed her ballot when she was 
employed. 








IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED 
it hereby is, revoked 
hereby is, rescinded. 
February 24, 1993 




that the bargaining order 
Lon 
be, 
Pauline R. Kinsella'" 
Auu<c^Z?r 
Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric2f. Schmertz, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JEFFERSON COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
EDUCATIONAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NOVnc-3840 




JEFFERSON LOCAL, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
ROBERT D. CLEARFIELD, GENERAL COUNSEL (HAROLD G. BEYER, JR. 
of counsel), for Petitioner 
GEORGE E. MEAD, III, ESQ., for Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Jefferson (County) and the Jefferson County Community College 
(College) and the Jefferson Local, Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) on a petition filed by the Jefferson 
County Community College Educational Support Personnel 
Association (Association). On the basis of stipulated facts and 
C-3840 - Board -2 
offers of proof, the Director found the County and the College to 
be the joint employer of the noninstructional staff at the 
College. Accordingly, on the basis of prior decisions,^ he 
fragmented those employees from an existing county-wide unit-7 
which is represented by^CSEA.He^ordered' an^election among tJae 
College's noninstructional staff in which CSEA and the 
Association were allowed to participate, on condition, inter 
alia, that they submit a minimum 30% showing of interest, which 
each has done. 
The County and the College argue in their exceptions that 
the College is not a separate legal entity which would qualify it 
as a public employer, joint or otherwise. It argues that our 
prior decisions in Genesee and Dutchess, and the Director's 
decision in Niagara, are either wrong in their legal conclusions 
or are distinguishable on their facts. 
CSEA agrees with the County's and the College's exceptions 
and, in addition, argues that the Director erred in ordering an 
election, in permitting the Association to participate in an 
election, assuming one was appropriately ordered, and in 
subjecting it to a showing of interest requirement. 
-'Genesee Community College and County of Genesee (hereafter 
Genesee), 24 PERB ^3017 (1991); Dutchess Community College 
(hereafter Dutchess), 17 PERB f3010 (1984); Niagara County 
Community College and County of Niagara (hereafter Niagara), 
23 PERB 54052 (1990). 
-
7There already is a separate unit of faculty at the College. 
1 C-3840 - Board -3 
The Association argues in response that the Director's 
decision is correct on the law and the facts and should be 
affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments^ including—th"o^e—made—at-oraT argument, we affirm^the 
Director's decision. 
The County's and the College's main arguments were 
considered in Genesee and Niagara and, to a lesser extent, in 
Dutchess. We reaffirm those decisions, find them applicable to 
the facts of this case, and again conclude that a county-
sponsored community college is a separate legal entity and a 
joint employer with the sponsoring county of the employees who 
work for the community college because control over the terms and 
conditions of employment of those employees is shared. We also 
find that the nature of that joint employer relationship is 
itself sufficient to warrant the fragmentation of a community 
college's noninstructional personnel.-7 
The central thesis of the County's and the College's 
arguments to the contrary is that the College is nothing more 
than an expert agent of the County for the delivery of a 
particular service, no different than any other County 
department. Those arguments, however, are inconsistent with the 
-
70ur recent decision in County of Nassau, 25 PERB J[3036 (1992) , 
in which we found an appointed sheriff not to be a joint employer 
with a county, is not relevant to this case because our 
conclusion there was dictated by the historically peculiar traits 
of the employment relationship within a sheriff's department. 
C-3840 - Board -4 
status and powers of the College, exercised through its board of 
trustees, as conferred upon it by regulations-7 promulgated by 
the trustees of the State University of New York pursuant to 
Article 126 of the Education Law. Those regulations recognize 
the^boards—-0-f—trustees~-o"f community colleges to be~"legal 
official bodies corporate."-7 Those same regulations vest in a 
community college president and a community college board of 
trustees broad powers and duties relating to budgets, salary 
schedules and salaries, personnel appointments, promotions, 
retention, retrenchment and administration of collective 
bargaining agreements.-7 
The County and the College would have us disregard these 
regulations because they are allegedly inconsistent with 
provisions of the Education Law. Having examined Article 126 of 
the Education Law, which covers the establishment, administration 
and operation of all community colleges, we do not find the 
regulations to be inconsistent with controlling provisions of the 
Education Law. To the contrary, the Education Law makes all 
community college sponsoring arrangements specifically subject to 
regulations prescribed by the State University of New York 
trustees.-7 We find that the regulations properly preserve the 
^
7N.Y.Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8(B), parts 600-607. 
-
7N.Y.Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8(B), §604.2. 
^
7N.Y.Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8(B), §604.3(b). 
Z7Educ. Law §6302.1 (McKinney 1985). 
C-3840 - Board -5 
County's statutory role regarding the establishment, budgeting, 
financing and auditing of the College. Subject to the general 
supervision of the State University of New York trustees, the 
discharge of other duties necessary or appropriate for the 
effective supervision^of a commuriity^college are vested in the 
college's board of trustees and its president.-7 Moreover, as 
we observed in Genesee, community colleges are specifically 
referenced in the Act as public employers having impasse 
procedures distinct from those applicable to the employees of the 
county sponsor.-1 These several provisions readily distinguish 
a community college from a department head of a county-controlled 
agency. 
That the community college sponsor appoints the majority of 
the community college's board of trustees—7 is not dispositive 
of the identity of the public employer. A sponsor's power to 
appoint members of a community college board of trustees is not 
necessarily the power to control the administration of the board 
of trustees itself. Once appointed, the trustees govern the 
college as trustees of the governing board, not agents of the 
sponsor. Other than the power of appointment, the record is 
§/Educ. Law §6306 (McKinney 1985 and Supp. 1993). 
^Compare Act. §209.3(f) and 209.3(e). 
—
7Educ. Law §63 06 (McKinney Supp. 1993). 
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barren of any indication that the County controls the decision-
making of the college's board of trustees.—7 
It is similarly irrelevant that the County may not have been 
exercising the full range of its statutory and regulatory powers 
or performing the full range of~~its-duties Under law or rule, 
even as to collective bargaining or contract administration. It 
is the power to assert the prerogatives of its status which makes 
the College a joint employer, not that it has thus far acquiesced 
in the County's control. In that regard, we view the College 
simply to have made the County its agent for the performance of 
certain of its functions. 
The County and the College also argue that the College 
cannot be a public employer because it does not exercise 
governmental powers, such as the power to tax, to enact general 
legislation, to take by eminent domain or to exercise police 
powers. Those, however, are merely indicia of public employer 
status, taken from North County Library System, decided in 
1968.—/ Cases decided since North County Library System 
clearly show that it is enough to bestow public employer status 
upon a county-sponsored community college that it is established 
and operated pursuant to state law and that its functions and 
operations are subject to modification by the State Legislature 
—
/See generally Queens Borough Public Library v. PERB, 64 N.Y.2d 
1099, 18 PERB J[7007 (1985), aff'g 104 A.D.2d 993, 17 PERB [^7020 
(2d Dep't 1984). 
^
71 PERB 5399.48 (1968). 
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and by regulation of the State University of New York 
Trustees.—7 
The County's and the College's remaining arguments, 
including those centering on the admitted status of a regional 
community college as a public employerT^^are covered by the 
discussions in Genesee, Dutchess and Niagara, which are 
applicable here and with results that continue to be controlling. 
Having affirmed the Director's decision to fragment the 
noninstructional employees who work at the College on the basis 
of the joint employer relationship,—7 we come to CSEA's 
exceptions. As noted, the Director ordered an election and 
allowed the Association to move to intervene for placement on the 
ballot pursuant to §201.9(h)(1) of our Rules of Procedure. In 
ordering that election, the Director required CSEA to submit a 
showing of interest. 
—University of the State of New York v. Newman, A.D.2d , 
25 PERB 57005 (3d Dep't 1992); State of New York fInsurance Dep't 
Liquidation Bureau) v. PERB, 20 PERB ^7021 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 
1987), aff'd. 146 A.D.2d 961, 22 PERB f7008 (3d Dep't 1989). 
Like the entities in those cases, community colleges are 
ultimately politically accountable to various governments. 
^Educ. Law §6310.12 (McKinney 1985). We believe this statutory 
provision, extending public employer status to a regionally-
sponsored community college, to have been intended to assure 
application of the public employer status already extended to 
community colleges established and operating under other 
sponsoring arrangements. There is no basis to conclude that the 
Legislature intended some community colleges to be covered 
employers but not others. 
—
7The basis for fragmentation makes it unnecessary to consider 
the Employer's argument that the existing unit would not 
otherwise be appropriately fragmented. 
C-3840 - Board 
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CSEA argues that under Evancrelisto v. Newmanr—' it, as the 
former representative of the College's noninstructionals, 
continues as a matter of right as the bargaining agent for the 
noninstructional unit at the College because the Association's 
petition was for-decertification only^ . 
The issue in Evancrelisto, however, was whether employees, 
following fragmentation from a bargaining unit, were entitled 
under §209-a.l(e) of the Act to a continuation of the terms of 
the contract which had been applicable to them before their 
fragmentation. There was no representation question present in 
Evangelisto as there is here. Therefore, we do not find 
Evangelisto to control or influence a disposition of the 
representation question which is raised by the petition in this 
case and hold that the Director correctly decided that CSEA did 
not, as a matter of right, continue as the bargaining agent for 
the fragmented employees. 
CSEA argues alternatively that if an election is appropriate 
to decide the representation question, then at least the 
Association should not be allowed to participate in that election 
because its petition was for decertification only. For this, 
CSEA relies upon our decision in Mineola Union Free School 
District.—7 In that case, we denied an alter-ego union 
permission to intervene in a representation proceeding because 
^
719 PERB f7021 (Albany Co. Sup. Ct. 1986). 
^20 PERB J[3001 (1987) . 
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the pending petition was for simple decertification of a 
bargaining agent within an existing unit. The Director 
distinguished Mineola—' because this case involves the creation 
of a new bargaining unit. The creation of a new bargaining unit 
involves circumstances materially^different from those in 
Mineola. Here, having formed a new unit, and having decided that 
an election was appropriate to determine the representative for 
that unit, the Director properly permitted the Association to 
intervene for placement on the ballot in that upcoming election. 
The privilege afforded the Association in that respect is no 
different from that which would have been afforded to any union. 
The Association's request for placement on the ballot was 
consistent with our Rules, not a circumvention of them as was the 
circumstance in Mineola. Therefore, we hold that the Director 
properly distinguished Mineola. 
CSEA argues lastly that it should have been exempted from a 
requirement to submit a showing of interest as a condition to its 
participation in an election among the College's noninstructional 
staff because it previously represented them in a county-wide 
unit. CSEA's status as bargaining agent for the County 
employees, however, affords it no special privileges as to other 
units. CSEA might not have enjoyed any support among the 
—
7The Director, however, on the basis of Mineola, denied the 
Association's request to convert the petition, which was being 
processed only as a petition for decertification, to one for 
certification as the exclusive representative for the 
noninstructional employees at the College. 
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noninstructional staff at the College at any time and still have 
been their representative so long as they remained within the 
unit of County employees. It is, in part, for this reason that 
only those organizations which are the recognized or certified 
representative-of-the employee^^in^the uniir^fouhd^to be 
appropriate are exempt under our Rules from the requirement to 
submit a showing of interest.—' Once the noninstructional 
staff were fragmented from the existing unit, there was no 
bargaining agent for that new unit, and it was appropriate under 
our existing Rules and decisions for CSEA to be required to 
submit the same 30% showing of interest from among the employees 
in the new unit as would be required of any other union seeking 
to participate in an election. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny CSEA's and the 
County's exceptions, affirm the Director's decision, and remand 
the case to the Director for the conduct of an election as 
ordered. 
DATED: February 24, 1993 
Albany, New York 
^.U.^ML 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walte E i senberg , Meofber 
) 
^
7 Rules of Procedure , § 2 0 1 . 9 ( h ) ( 1 ) . 
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^ STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
I 
i 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, APL-CIO, GREENE 
COUNTY LOCAL 820, CAIRO-DURHAM CENTRAL 
SCHOOL DISTRICT UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12449 
CAIRO-DURHAM CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL, of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
RUBERTI, GIRVIN & FERLAZZO (JAMES E. GIRVIN of counsel), 
^ for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Greene County Local 820, Cairo-Durham Central School District 
Unit (CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
CSEA's charge alleges that the Cairo-Durham Central School 
District (District) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it subcontracted its cafeteria 
operation. 
We had earlier remanded-7 this case to the ALJ for 
consideration of the negotiating history of Article XXII of the 
l 
y 
1725 PERB ^ 3 0 5 2 , r emand ing 25 PERB J[4521 ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 
"^  Board - U-12449 -2 
parties' contract,-7 which the District alleges gives it the 
right to subcontract the cafeteria operation. Following that 
remand, the ALJ traced the relevant negotiating history and he 
concluded, after crediting the District's witnesses, that the 
parties had agreed to permit the District to run its cafeteria 
operation under a private subcontract. Accordingly, he dismissed 
the charge. This appeal is from that determination. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that we should reconsider our 
earlier decision and disregard any testimony about the 
negotiating history or intent of Article XXII. CSEA also argues 
that the ALJ erred in finding that the parties agreed to permit 
the subcontracting of the cafeteria operation. 
The District argues in response that our remand of the ALJ's 
earlier decision was correct. On the merits, the District argues 
that the ALJ's decision is correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
^Article XXII of the parties' contract provides: 
Salary increases given to the cafeteria workers are 
dependent upon the cafeteria operating at a profit 
without any increase in the cost of lunches to the 
students attributable to salaries. In the event that 
the cafeteria fails to operate at a profit during any 
calendar month of the school year, the Board of 
Education reserves the right to close the cafeteria and 
lay off the employees or to lay off any number of 
employees so as to maintain the cafeteria at a self-
sustaining basis. 
A Board - U-12449 -3 
CSEA's arguments regarding application of the parol evidence 
rule are not materially different from those presented for our 
consideration on review of the AKT's first decision. We find no 
greater reason to accept them on this second appeal. Therefore, 
the ALJ's consideration of negotiating history was both required 
and permitted under our prior decision and order, which we 
reaffirm. 
In dismissing the charge, the AKT found that there was an 
agreement permitting the District to subcontract the cafeteria 
operation. In finding that agreement, the ALJ concluded that the 
actions which were taken and the statements which were made in 
conjunction with the negotiation of Article XXII established the 
exchange of mutual promises necessary to the formation of an 
agreement-'' to subcontract. The ALJ's decision in this respect 
rests substantially upon credibility resolutions which are 
consistent with the record. Having acted within the scope of the 
rights afforded it by the contract, the District obviously cannot 
have acted unilaterally in subcontracting the cafeteria 
operation. It follows necessarily that CSEA's unilateral change 
allegations must be dismissed. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision on remand is affirmed. 
5/Act §201.12. 
Board - U-12449 -4 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 24, 1993 
Albany, New York 
fxX^y^dk* 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
UMt^cu K. 
Walter L. E i senberg , Member 
E r i c J . aehmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 694, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
=aird= CASE NOr^U-^12669 
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT T. DeCATALDO 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
NORMA MEACHAM, ESQ. (ANDREA R. LURIE of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Local 694, 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ). After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed CSEA's charge against 
the State of New York - Unified Court System (State-UCS) which 
alleges that the State-UCS violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it issued a memorandum 
to court reporters assigned to the Court of Claims, announcing 
that it would no longer provide them with certain supplies or 
maintain or repair certain of their equipment. In dismissing the 
charge, the ALJ held that the State-UCS was entitled to rely upon 
Board - U-12 669 -2 
the clear terms of a 1984-87 Page Rate Agreement-7 under which 
it "shall not provide any equipment or supplies except 
stenographic machine packets". Therefore, notwithstanding a more 
generous,-7 inconsistent practice, which was followed by the 
State-UCS during the term of the Page Rate Agreement, and for 
approximately one year after its expiration on June 30, 1987, the 
ALT concluded that the State-UCS was privileged to revert 
unilaterally to the terms of the Page Rate Agreement. The ALJ 
then dismissed the charge because the June 1991 memorandum is 
consistent with the terms of the Page Rate Agreement. 
CSEA excepts only to the ALJ's conclusion of law, 
contending that the expiration of the Page Rate Agreement denied 
the State-UCS any right of reversion to its terms. As such, CSEA 
maintains that the State-UCS was required to continue its more 
generous past practice regarding court reporters7 supplies and 
equipment. 
The State-UCS argues in response that the ALJ's decision is 
correct as a matter of law, logic and labor relations policy and 
should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the ALT's decision. 
-
7The Page Rate Agreement is a contract separate from the 
parties7 main collective bargaining agreement. The parties are 
still in negotiations for a successor to the Page Rate Agreement. 
-
7Until June 28, 1991, unit employees received from the State-UCS 
all supplies necessary for the production of transcripts 
furnished to it. 
^ Board - U-12 669 -3 
In Maine-Endwell Central School District-7 (hereafter 
Maine-Endwell), we held that an employer was privileged to revert 
to the terms of its collective,bargaining agreement 
notwithstanding an inconsistent past practice. Our theory was 
that having reached an agreement on a subject matter, that 
agreement, not any practice with respect thereto, fixed and 
controlled the terms and conditions of employment. In effect, 
despite the reversion from practice to the contract terms, the 
status quo was nonetheless maintained. 
Although accepting the premise of Maine-Endwell, CSEA argues 
that it should not apply after the contract expires. According 
to CSEA, after contract expiration, but not before, it has a 
right with respect to any particular subject to elect 
continuation of either the term of the contract or the employer's 
more generous practice. We do not agree, however, that the Act 
effects this one-sided result. We do not believe Maine-Endwell 
to have been wrongly decided nor do we find it inapplicable in 
circumstances in which the contract has expired. In that latter 
respect, we cannot discern any persuasive relationship between a 
contract's expiration and the theory upon which Maine-Endwell 
rests. 
In addition to the reasons advanced by the ALJ, we believe a 
dismissal of CSEA's charge is warranted when consideration is 
given to an employer's obligations under §209-a.l(e) of the Act. 
^15 PERB 53025 (1982), aff'a 14 PERB f4625 (1981). 
Board - U-12669 -4 
Section 209-a.l(e) of the Act requires an employer to continue 
all terms of an expired agreement with certain exceptions not 
here applicable. The Page Rate Agreement in this case is plainly 
an agreement within the meaning of §209-a.l(e). Thus, the State-
UCS was obligated to continue its terms. CSEA, however, would 
make unlawful under §209-a.l(d) of the Act that which it could 
require under §209-a.l(e) by a proper and timely charge. We 
consider this a paradoxical and illogical result which should be 
avoided in our interpretation of an employer's statutory status 
quo obligation. It is avoided easily by recognizing that it is 
the parties' specific agreements, whether within or without their 
stated duration, which express the status quo and define the 
terms and conditions of employment which must be continued for 
purposes of both §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Act. By this, an 
employer remains duty bound, absent applicable defense, to 
continue all terms of an expired agreement, but it does not 
otherwise violate the Act by doing so. Similarly, a union 
continues its entitlement to the benefits of its last negotiated 
agreement on a particular subject, but not to practices 
inconsistent with that agreement. 
In summary, we hold that Maine-Endwell applies both during 
and after contract expiration.-1 Therefore, the State-UCS did 
-'Our holding makes it unnecessary to determine whether the Page 
Rate Agreement is still in effect, notwithstanding its stated 
expiration, under Ass'n of Surrogate's and Supreme Court 
Reporters v. State of New York, 79 N.Y.2d 39, 25 PERB 57502 
(1992). 
Board - U-12669 -5 
not violate the Act as alleged when it insisted upon compliance 
with the terms of its Page Rate Agreement despite a contrary 
practice. For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 24, 1993 
Albany, New York 
% w VOL %. ^  K yva JI L 
Pauline R. Kinsella,, CQ; au^ .ine R. Kmsella,, Chairperson 
Zr- ^^y^t^i^ 
Waltep-*f. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAPPINGERS FEDERATION OF WORKERS, 
NYSUT/AFT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12914 
WAPPINGERS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
WALTER T. FULTS, for Charging Party 
RAYMOND G. KRUSE, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Wappingers 
) Central School District (District) to a decision by the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director) on a charge filed against the District by 
the Wappingers Federation of Workers, NYSUT/AFT (Federation). As 
relevant to these exceptions, the Assistant Director held that 
the District had refused the Federation's demand to negotiate the 
impact of a unilaterally imposed directive requiring unit 
employees to fill out certain time sheets at the end of the 
workday in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) .-1 
l/rThe charge also complained about the unilateral imposition of 
the requirement and a refusal to bargain on demand the decision 
to require the time sheets. The Assistant Director dismissed the 
former allegation for lack of jurisdiction because the 
i requirement arguably violated the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement. He dismissed the latter allegation because there is 
no duty to bargain regarding a work rule requirement already 
addressed by the parties' contract. No exceptions have been 
filed to these aspects of the Assistant Director's decision. 
Board - U-12914 -2 
The District argues on appeal that the impact bargaining 
allegation should have been dismissed pursuant to its motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or for failure to set forth a 
prima facie case, which it made after the Federation had rested 
on direct. It also argues that it satisfied its duty to 
negotiate the impact of its directive by meeting with the 
Federation's grievance chairperson, Peter Borzi, and by 
subsequently changing the time sheets. The Federation has not 
responded to the District's exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the District's 
arguments, we affirm the Assistant Director's decision. 
The District's motion to dismiss is not reasonably read to 
embrace the impact bargaining allegation. The motion, as we view 
it, is limited to the unilateral change and decisional bargaining 
allegations, both of which the Assistant Director dismissed. 
Even were we to read the motion to dismiss more broadly, 
dismissal of the impact bargaining allegation pursuant to that 
motion would not be correct. The District's alleged refusal to 
bargain the impact of the time sheets did not raise any arguable 
violation of the parties' contract which would have necessitated 
a jurisdictional dismissal pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act. 
Additionally, there was evidence sufficient to withstand a motion 
to dismiss submitted on the Federation's direct case because the 
record shows the Federation's demand to bargain impact and the 
District's arguable noncompliance. 
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The impact bargaining demand was made by Joseph LaCicero, 
the Federation's president, to John Marmillo, the District's 
Assistant Superintendent for Personnel. Marmillo told LaCicero 
that George Foster, the District's Director of Facilities and 
Operations, who had issued the directive in issue, would meet 
with him. Foster never did. Instead, unbeknownst to LaCicero, 
Foster met with Borzi to discuss "problems" caused by the time 
sheets. Even assuming, as the District argues, that Foster was 
empowered to negotiate on behalf of the District, we have nothing 
to establish that Borzi was the Federation's agent for impact 
bargaining or that he was otherwise empowered to bargain on 
behalf of the Federation. As noted, LaCicero did not even know 
of the meeting between Foster and Borzi. Foster's meeting with 
Borzi might be loosely characterized as a meeting to adjust 
grievances, for which purpose Borzi might have been empowered by 
virtue of his position as grievance chairperson. A grievance 
discussion, however, is not synonymous with impact bargaining and 
it does not satisfy a particularized demand to bargain regarding 
a subject area. Minimally, the District owed LaCicero, or other 
authorized agent of the Federation, notice that the grievance 
meeting with Borzi was intended as its response to LaCicero's 
demand for impact bargaining. That notice would have permitted 
the Federation to either withdraw its bargaining demand as 
appropriate or to delineate its impact proposals. In summary, 
and as the Assistant Director concluded, the record does not show 
Board - U-12914 
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that any impact negotiations were ever had or intended by the 
District regarding the time sheets. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions 
are denied and the Assistant Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District negotiate the 
impact of its mandated use of "daily time sheets" and sign and 
post notice in the form attached at all locations normally used 
to post written communications to unit employees. 
DATED: February 24, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Lulme R. K m s e l l e "n Paulin  in a, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the Wappingers Central School District (District) in the unit represented by 
the Wappingers Federation of Workers, NYSUT/AFT (Federation) that the District will negotiate the impact 
of its mandated use of "Daily Time Sheets". 
WAPPINGERS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Dated . By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
2F- 2/24/93 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUFFOLK EDUCATIONAL LOCAL 870, CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, AFSCME, 
LOCAL 1000, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Partyy 
-and- CASE NO. U-12938 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, 
THIRD SUPERVISORY DISTRICT, SUFFOLK 
COUNTY, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ and 
STEVEN A. CRAIN of counsel), for Charging Party 
INGERMAN, SMITH, GREENBERG, GROSS, RICHMOND, 
HEIDELBERGER, REICH & SCRICCA (JOHN H. GROSS and 
NEIL M. BLOCK of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Suffolk 
Educational Local 870, Civil Service Employees Association, 
AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO (CSEA) and cross-exceptions filed by 
the Board of Cooperative Educational Services, Third Supervisory 
District, Suffolk County (BOCES) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). CSEA alleges in its charge that 
BOCES violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it refused to pay a salary increment to 
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certain teacher aides contrary to an established past practice 
and the terms of an expired collective bargaining agreement.-7 
After hearing, the ALT dismissed the §209-a.l(d) allegation 
for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to §205.5(d) of the Act. In 
that respect, he concluded that Association of Surrogates and 
Supreme Court Reporters v. State of New York-7 (hereafter 
Surrogates II) kept the parties7 contract in effect beyond its 
stated expiration date. Having determined that the contract was 
still in effect, the ALJ held that we were divested of 
jurisdiction over the §209-a.l(d) allegation which is grounded 
upon a failure to continue a mandatory subject of negotiation 
covered by the contract. He held, however, that CSEA had stated 
a cause of action within our jurisdiction under §209-a.1(e) of 
the Act. In that respect, the ALJ held that Surrogates II was 
not intended to divest us of jurisdiction over alleged violations 
of §209-a.l(e) because that result would frustrate the very 
purpose of that subsection of the Act. The ALJ dismissed the 
§209-a.l(e) allegation, however, on a finding that CSEA does not 
represent the employees whom it alleges are owed a salary 
-'The contract term allegedly violated is Article XX, Salary 
which provides, in relevant part, as follows: "There will be a 
uniform anniversary date of July 1 for all placement and 
advancement purposes." 
^79 N.Y.2d 39, 25 PERB [^7502 (1992). In that case, the Court of 
Appeals held that State Finance Law §200(2-b), which effected a 
five-day lag payroll upon nonjudicial employees of the Unified 
Court System, was unconstitutional because it impaired the 
union's collective bargaining agreement in violation of the 
contract clause of the Federal Constitution (U.S. Const., Art. 1, 
§10, CI. 1). 
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increment. The ALJ used this same finding of fact as an 
alternative basis for dismissal of the §209-a.l(d) allegation. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in finding 
that it did not represent the employees in issue. It argues also 
that the ALT's jurisdictional dismissal of the §209-a.l(d) 
allegation is wrong because it reflects an incorrect 
interpretation of Surrogates II. BOCES argues in its exceptions 
that the ALJ also should have dismissed the §209-a.l(e) 
allegation because Surrogates II precludes there being the 
"expired agreement" necessary to state a cause of action under 
that subsection of the Act.-7 It otherwise supports the ALJ's 
findings and his dismissal of the charge. 
Having reviewed the parties' arguments, including those at 
oral argument,-7 we affirm the ALT's dismissal of the charge. 
In doing so, we do not reach what the ALJ characterized as 
jurisdictional determinations regarding the §209-a.l(d) and (e) 
allegations. The ALJ's finding that CSEA does not represent 
summer employees, akin to a determination on standing, is as much 
a threshold question as is the effect of Surrogates II upon 
improper practice charges filed under §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the 
Act. By affirming on the ALJ's finding of fact on this threshold 
-''Section 209-a.l(e) of the Act makes it an improper practice for 
a public employer "to refuse to continue all the terms of an 
expired agreement until a new agreement is negotiated. . . . " 
-
7We granted oral argument to hear the parties' positions on the 
ALJ's controlling finding of fact, as well as their views on the 
effect of Surrogates II upon our improper practice jurisdiction. 
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issue, questions associated with Surrogates II become only 
incidental to our determination in this case. Given the 
importance of the questions which are raised by Surrogates II and 
the possibility of judicial appeal from any order based thereon, 
we believe that the issues raised by Surrogates II are best 
decided in a case in which an analysis of the Court of Appeals' 
decision is necessary to our disposition of the improper practice 
charge. 
We affirm, however, the ALJ's finding that the employees in 
issue are not in CSEA's unit. CSEA represents a unit of full-
time teacher aides who work either ten or eleven months for the 
BOCES. The BOCES also employs persons to staff its one-month 
summer school program. Some of those it hires for the summer are 
teacher aides who work during the regular school year. The 
record shows that CSEA has never bargained for or otherwise 
represented any of the summer school employees. CSEA argues 
nonetheless that the contract terms which apply to the full-time 
unit employees inure to their benefit if they are hired for the 
summer. We do not accept this'"spillover" theory of 
representation. 
The parties' contract and practice establish that summer 
employees, as a class, are presently unrepresented. CSEA has no 
statutory rights in relevant respect regarding unrepresented 
employees. We do not consider ten-month and eleven-month teacher 
aides, who happen to work during the summer in that capacity, or 
any other, to be in CSEA's unit. The summer hirings by the BOCES 
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are an act in no way attributable or tied to any individual's 
employment during the regular school year. Looking at the issue 
somewhat differently, we do not consider summer work to be unit 
work of the present bargaining unit. CSEA's unit work in this 
case is defined by the contract duration of its full-time 
employees' employment. Therefore, the BOCES' failure to extend a 
salary increment to any of the summer school teacher aides could 
not violate any statutory duty owed to CSEA under §209-a.l(d) or 
(e) of the Act. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions to the 
ALJ's finding of fact are denied, CSEA's and the BOCES' 
exceptions in other respects are dismissed, and the ALJ's 
decision dismissing the charge is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 24, 1993 
Albany, New York 
^rw\i~\ ^ .Cvivu^l 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
IsujesU*- ^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric J/: Schmertz, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THE COUNTY OF TOMPKINS CASE NO. S-0011 
for a determination pursuant to 
CSL §212 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On April 21, 1992, the Tompkins County Board of 
Representatives adopted Resolution No. 141 which repealed an 
J 
earlier resolution establishing the Tompkins County Public 
Employment Relations Board. Pursuant to the resolution, all 
local provisions and procedures pertaining to the Tompkins County 
PERB were terminated. A notice of termination was published by 
the Clerk of the Board of Representatives of Tompkins County and 
copies of the notice were posted for five days and included in a 
local newspaper advertisement. 
We find that the County of Tompkins has fully complied with 
§203.6 of our Rules of Procedure to terminate a local PERB and 
we, therefore, determine that our February 21, 1968 order 
approving the establishment of a local public employment 
relations board, should be rescinded. 
J 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the order of this Board, dated 
February 21, 1968, approving the resolution establishing the 
Tompkins County Public Employment Relations Board be, and the 
same hereby is, rescinded. 
DATED: February 24, 1993 
Albany, New York 
$4^%. .L™1\ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
^t>^c^2r,^i 
L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric A. Schmertz, Member| 
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") STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ASSOCIATION OP MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10600 
COUNTY OP SUFFOLK and SUFFOLK COUNTY 
POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
Respondents. 
ROBERT M. ZISKIN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
ROBERT J. CIMINO, ESQ. (ANN SMITH COATES of counsel), 
for Respondents 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Association of Municipal Employees (AME) excepts to an 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALT) dismissal of its improper 
practice charge which alleges that the County of Suffolk and the 
Suffolk County Police Department (County) violated §209-a.l(a) 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it refused to hire Winifred Kuhn as a Detention Attendant 
(attendant) because she engaged in activities protected by the 
Act.-/. The ALJ concluded, after a hearing, that regardless of 
whether AME had established a prima facie case of interference 
and discrimination, the County proved that it declined to hire 
Kuhn because of poor recommendations from two of her former 
-''The charge as filed covered three other employees, but it was 
withdrawn as to them after they were offered employment with the 
County. The attendant title is in the unit represented by AME. 
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employers and unfavorable information about her received from her 
neighbors. Finding that Kuhn's protected activities did not 
cause her to be denied employment as an attendant, the ALJ 
dismissed the charge. 
AME has filed many objections to the ALJ's decision which 
focus on the ALJ's credibility findings and the ALJ's analysis of 
the record evidence. The County has not filed a response. 
Having reviewed the record and considered AME's arguments, we 
deny the exceptions and affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Kuhn previously worked for the County as a per diem Precinct 
Matron (matron). As a matron, Kuhn's work schedule was dependent 
on the County's need and she was on-call twenty-four hours a day, 
to report whenever the County had taken a female into custody. 
When called in, she would inventory the prisoner's personal 
property, conduct a search, lodge and transport the prisoner and 
secure medical attention as needed. In October 1988,-1 the 
County discontinued its practice of calling in matrons in favor 
of the new, full-time attendant title. In May 1989, Kuhn's 
application for employment as an attendant was rejected. She was 
notified by letter that the County found her "unsuited" for the 
attendant position because "two (2) of three (3) recent employers 
would not rehire you, while the neighborhood also yielded 
unfavorable information. It is for these reasons that a decision 
was made not to offer you the position you seek." 
-
7Having sustained an injury, Kuhn last worked as a matron on 
October 20, 1988. 
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As noted by the ALJ, there is evidence that the County was 
aware of Kuhn's limited protected activities and of comments by 
some County representatives which might show some animus toward 
those activities.-7 However, even if a prima facie violation of 
the Act was established on this evidence, the County has shown 
that it had a legitimate reason for its refusal to hire Kuhn and 
that it acted based upon that legitimate reason. There is no 
evidence that comments by County officials about the matrons7 
union involvement in general, or Kuhn's activities in particular, 
had any impact on the decision not to hire Kuhn as an attendant. 
Indeed, the County officials who made the comments were not the 
ones who conducted the employment investigation or who made the 
decision not to hire her as an attendant. The ALJ's conclusion, 
supported by her credibility resolutions, that Kuhn's negative 
recommendations were the reason she was not hired is consistent 
with the record. Although most of AME's exceptions dispute the 
ALJ's conclusion in this respect, we find no basis in the record 
to disturb it. 
Many of AME7s exceptions ask us to evaluate the truth and 
the fairness of the evaluations by Kuhn's former employers. The 
ALJ correctly found, however, that such a determination would not 
be relevant in this case. The issue here is not whether the 
-''Kuhn and the other matrons had several job-related complaints 
which they were discussing with County representatives. They 
were advised by the County not to go to the press or to a union 
with their complaints, preferring that they be resolved 
internally. 
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reports of her prior work history are fair or accurate in fact or 
from Kuhn's perspective, nor whether the County's investigatory 
techniques were "inept". The issue is whether Kuhn's protected 
activities caused her to be denied employment as an attendant. 
There is no evidence to support a conclusion that the County 
acted upon the evaluations from Kuhn's other employers and 
neighbors knowing them to be false. Nor is there any evidence 
that the County would have independently verified the accuracy of 
those reports had it not been for Kuhn's protected activities. 
On this record, therefore, we find that Kuhn's protected 
activities did not cause the County to reject her application for 
employment as an attendant. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied 
and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: February 24, 1993 
Albany, New York 
tiA^/tX^ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
*~T Z <• 
Waltarj L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/u. Schmertz, Membe 
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^ STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. 
AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4011 
EAST ROCHESTER UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
EAST ROCHESTER NON-TEACHING UNION, NEA/NY, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO, has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-4011 
- 2 -
Unit: Included: All full-time and regularly scheduled part-time 
employees employed by the employer in the 
following job titles: Cleaner, Custodian, 
Clerk-Typist, Grounds Equipment Operator, Food 
Service Helper, Maintenance Mechanic I, 
Laborer, and Cook-Manager. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: February 24, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chai lrperson 
^r 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
^rV-
Eric/J. Schmertz, Me: 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS, DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4034 
NORTH SHORE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
) above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 424, A Division of United Industry 
Workers, District Council 424, has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
i J
 Unit: Included: All full-time, part-time cooks, assistant cooks 
and food service workers. 
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Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Public Service 
Employees Union, Local 424, A Division of United Industry 
Workers, District Council 424. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: February 24, 1993 
Albany, New York 
;% JiL. k /Wt t JL . 
Pauline "R. Kinsel laJ"chairperson 
Aua^ ^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/cT. Schmertz, Membe 
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MEMORANDUM 
F e b r u a r y 1 7 , 1993 
TO: Board 
FROM: John M. Crotty' 
RE: Rule Change V. 
Among other information, an improper practice charge must 
include the following under §204.1(b)(4): 
if the charge alleges a violation of section 
209-a.l(d) or section 209-a.2(b) of the act, 
whether the charging party has notified the 
board in writing of the existence of an 
impasse pursuant to section 205.2 of this 
Chapter; 
The reference to §205.2 is incorrect. Section 205.1 of 
the Rules covers notification of impasses. Therefore, 
§204.1(b)(4) should be amended to substitute "205.1" for "205.2". 
